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Teaching Thinking - 1
Abstract
What is it we want most for students to gain through school? We undoubtedly would agree that it is
the ability to manage their lives on their own, competently, considerately, and productively.
What is it that we try hardest to teach to students in school? We undoubtedly must agree that it is
reading, writing, mathematics, social studies, and science.
What is the underlying match between our consensual goals and our conventional curriculum? That is,
why do we teach the things we do? There are, of course, several answers. First, within these disciplines
there lie certain basic survival tools, certain knowledge and skills that all adults ought to have. Beyond
that, there are also, for some students in some of these disciplines, the beginnings of what may become
career-specific knowledge and skills. But we would argue that, for the random student, the real motive
for including any particular topic in the curriculum runs deeper. The real motive, we would argue,
derives from the potential value of that topic as a medium for teaching the students about different
perspectives and modes of thought that they might apply to their own worlds.
If this is indeed the major goal of our curricular content, then it is not, in the current educational
context, serving its purpose. I am willing to assert this on a single argument: The very idea that the real
purpose of immersing students in such stuff is to teach thinking is strictly an adult insight.
Students, in contrast, believe too often that the reason for studying history is to memorize the facts, the
reason for solving math problems is to get the right answers, and the reason for writing compositions
is because they have to. If we truly intend our course materials to be the vehicles as well as the objects
of thought, then that goal should not fall into the category of an adult insight. Indeed it should not be
an insight at all. It should be obvious, and it should be obvious to students while they are in school:
while they are trying to learn what we hope they will have learned by the time they get out.
The purpose of this preface is to make clear that, although this goal is currently all the rage, it is neither
revolutionary nor flaky. The development of thinking skills has long been a central if somewhat elusive
goal of our pedagogical agenda. The purpose of this paper is to argue that this goal is within reach.
More specifically, I will argue that an effective course on thinking skills should result in a single, well-
integrated schema. The schema should be built upon the principles and processes that the course is
intended to develop, and it must be richly and diversely elaborated with concrete or real-world instances
of application. The creation of such a schema requires explicit treatment of elementary concepts and
processes as well as their individual roles and interplay in more complex activities. In presentation, the
course must be nonpresumptuous, and equally so, about what the students do know already and what
they don't. And its contents must consistently be conveyed with piecewise clarity and overall direction
and coherence; both teachers and students must understand, concretely and conceptually and at all times,
both what they are trying to do and why.
In developing this argument, I will review and critique several existing thinking skills curricula in terms
of their pedagogical structure and documented effectiveness. While the argument is anchored in
contemporary theory and research in cognitive science, it has been honed through our own effort to
develop an effective and usable curriculum on thinking skills. I will therefore conclude the paper with
a discussion of that effort.
The current interest in teaching thinking has been provoked by the onset of the Information Era,
supported by recent advances in cognitive theory, and begged by the results of domestic evaluations (e.g.,
National Assessment of Educational Progress, 1981, 1983) and international comparisons (e.g., Travers,
1987) of our students' higher order cognitive skills. In spirit, the movement has been directed more
towards fostering excellence than overcoming the opposite. Yet there is the hope that, as the issues
become better understood and the curricula multiply and mature, it will yield effective methods for
correcting the special problems of low-achieving students. It is to this possibility that the present paper
is directed.
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TEACHING THINKING TO CHAPTER I STUDENTS
An Overview of Curricula on Thinking
In this section, I will provide an overview of existing curricula on thinking skills. I will not attempt a
program by program description and evaluation of these efforts as such reviews already abound in the
open literature (e.g., Chance, 1986; Chipman, Segal, & Glaser, 1985; Costa, 1985; Nickerson, Perkins,
& Smith, 1985; Segal, Chipman, & Glaser, 1985). Instead, I will treat the curricula as a group, doing
my best to describe their common assumptions, goals, and problems.
The fundamental assumption motivating all curricula on thinking is that there exists a certain set of skills
or processes that are common to thinking in general, regardless of person, domain, or purpose. The
common goal of the curricula is to teach those processes and, in that sense, all fall under the general
rubric of process-oriented curricula. In terms of approach, however, they subdivide into two groups.
Within the first group, the lessons are built around complex "ecologically valid" materials such as real-
world conundrums, specially written stories about the true-to-life problem-posing environments and
problem-solving lessons of model compeers, the students' own writing or schoolwork, or even the
contents of Great Books (see Costa, 1985). The processes targeted by this first group center on what
Paul (1984) has termed "macrological skills," such as creativity and the ability to deal with complex
information and multiple points of view.
Within the second group, the lesson materials are abstract, similar to those found in standardized
psychometric tests of aptitude: dot matrices, geometric figures, and simple lexical or pictorial multiple-
choice items. The processes targeted by this group of programs center on what Paul has termed
"micrological skills," such as observation, classification, and sequencing.
A question of primary interest, for both theoretical and practical reasons, is what are the basic and
universal processes that these curricula collectively endorse. The task of generating a coherent answer
to this question is made difficult, but not impossible, by the cross-program differences in the levels or
complexities of the targeted processes. However, there are other, more vexing obstacles to this
endeavor. First, and perhaps most surprisingly, the curricula are not uniformly explicit about the
processes they are intended to develop (and this is somewhat independent of whether the processes are
named or numbered). Second, even when lists of processes are provided, they often reflect a sloppy
partitioning of the potential space. As one example, process lists for the Instrumental Enrichment
curriculum cite logical reasoning as distinct from inductive and deductive reasoning (Chance, 1986; Link,
1985). As another, among the 60 skills comprising deBono's CoRT Thinking Materials (1975), there is
considerable overlap, for example, "Consider All Factors," "Input," "Expand," and "Information;"
"Opposing Points of View" and "Examine Both Sides;" and "Objectives," "Define the Problem," "Target,"
and "Purpose." Third, where process overlap clearly does exist between programs, it is often disguised
by differences in nomenclature. Thus, what one calls divergent thinking, another calls lateral thinking;
what one calls sequencing, another calls operational analyses, and so on.
At a more general level, the vast majority of the programs are directed toward developing students'
analytical and logical acumen. But even here, there are ardently voiced differences of opinion. Paul
(1984) argues that programs intended to develop such "critical/analytic" thinking skills can be, at best,
of limited, short-term value. What students need most, he argues, are "strong-sense" thinking skills, skills
that support the dialectic, that generate fair-mindedness and reasoned judgment. These skills, he
continues, are based on principled and not procedural thought; they represent a different mode of
thinking from that which is emphasized by the critical/analytic approach and cannot be developed
through any direct extension thereof.
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Edward deBono (1984) comes down on the value of critical thinking and logic with at least as much
force:
... as the teaching of thinking becomes fashionable, there is the serious danger that educators will
turn to the only sort of thinking they know: critical thinking.
The emphasis on critical thinking has long been the bane of society and education. (p. 16)
deBono then asserts that what students lack most are creative thinking skills; to master these, they need
training in perception. His argument is that:
If the perceptions are inadequate, they cannot be put right by an excellence of logic. Indeed,
there is a real danger that we accept an error-free argument as correct when the logic may be
correct, but the perceptions on which it is based are grossly faulty. (de Bono, 1985, p. 367)
Despite the apparent disarray and disagreement, I will argue that there is, in fact, considerable
commonality of goals across these programs. I would agree with Paul's (1984) position that students
need develop the sort of critical but open-minded, flexible, and nonegocentric thinking skills of the
dialectic. On the other hand, I would assert that the only rational path to these abilities is through the
critical and analytic skills that he rejects.
Similarly, I must agree with deBono, that perceptual inflexibility or a fixedness on bad information is
a major cause of irrationality and a major obstacle to creative or productive thinking. On the other
hand, short of perfect knowledge, logic is the only recourse we have for detecting the incompleteness
or inconsistencies of our perceptions. Actually, deBono acknowledges this himself time and again in his
writings. Moreover, his own curriculum, the CoRT thinking program, is focused on the logical, analytical
skills necessary for evaluating one's information and perceptions. deBono, in short, differs more in
posture than stance from the other program developers.
In the final analysis, the major difference between programs is that with which we began: the difference
in the levels of the targeted processes and principles (macrological versus micrological) and the nature
of the materials (abstract versus real-world) through which they are exercised. In terms of pedagogical
goals, even this distinction is empty: As mentioned above, the development of macrological processes
presumes operational knowledge of the micrological processes; and conversely, the very reason for
teaching micrological processes is to build a sound, analytic base for macrological growth. In terms of
pedagogical effectiveness, however, the two approaches may differ significantly. Toward distilling the
respective strengths and weaknesses of the two approaches, a closer examination of several programs
is presented in the next section.
What Works and Why?
A Closer Examination of Six Programs
The question of what works would seem to be an easy one to answer. One need only examine the
evaluation data, or so it would seem. As it happens, however, the evaluation data on these efforts do
not allow straightforward comparisons. Where data exist and are easy to obtain, they are often flawed
in design and control (Sternberg & Bhana, 1986). The good, if qualified, news is that virtually every
reported evaluation includes evidence of some gains, and amidst the various evaluation efforts there are
also some extremely positive results.
But even restricting consideration to these positive results, there is room for disappointment. As shall
be discussed, the curricula are, to a greater or lesser extent, beset by at least one of the following
limitations: Substantial gains tend to show up only for some students, under the tutelage of only some
teachers, and only on tests that are closest in structure and content to the course itself.
A glance at the recent literature suggests there exist scores of programs on thinking skills. In fact, if
one restricts attention to those aimed at school children (as opposed to preschoolers, college students,
or adults), there really aren't very many. Of these, I will base the discussion in this section on only six,
selected for the simple reason that they were the programs about which I was able to obtain the most
information.
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The next six programs fall, three and three, into the categories of macrological and micrological. The
three macrological programs are CoRT Thinking Materials (deBono, 1975), Philosophy for Children
(Lipman, Sharp, & Oscanyan, 1980), and The Productive Thinking Program: A Course in Learning to
Think (Covington, Crutchfield, Davies, & Olton, 1974). The three micrological programs are
Instrumental Enrichment (Feuerstein, 1980), Intuitive Math (Burke, 1971), and Think (C. Adams, 1971).
One of the six programs, Productive Thinking, was designed for fifth and sixth graders. The rest were
designed for Grades 3 or 4 and up.
In this section, I will address the questions of how and why these programs are more and less effective,
focusing on each of the limitations cited above. As I do so, I will pay particular attention to the
distinction between macrological and micrological approaches and to the special needs of Chapter I
students.
Transfer
Of the three limitations, the most disheartening is the tendency for significant gains to show up only on
tests that are highly similar to the curricula in content and structure. What this means, in a nutshell,
is that transfer or generalization of the processes taught in these courses is limited. Yet, transfer is the
primary goal of a course on thinking. If the processes don't transfer, they cannot even be called
thinking. They can be called learning, or memory, or habit, but not thinking. The purpose of a course
on thinking is to enhance students' abilities to face new challenges and to attack novel problems
confidently, rationally, and productively. For Chapter I students, it is, moreover, to create the
intellectual leverage to catch up and move on.
Whether to choose wisely among existing programs or to invent new ones, an understanding of the
factors that promote and inhibit transfer is of first-order importance. My own conviction is that when
the mind resists doing something that we believe to be intelligent, it is almost always because it is giving
precedence to some conflicting but more important behavior. I shall now argue that the mind's apparent
resistance to transfer is an exact case in point.
Recent research in cognitive science converges on the conclusion that the human mind is nothing like
a piecemeal catalog of knowledge. When you learn about a topic, your memory does not just store away
a list of all of the observations, facts, and events about which you have learned. Instead, the substance
of each experience is reduced in memory to an extended array of primitives while its structure is
preserved through an intricate set of interconnections among the primitives. More specifically, the
interconnections capture all of the various relations among the constituents of the experience that were
noticed consciously or unconsciously, in its processing.
The power of these memory structures, or schemas as they are most often called in the psychological
literature, derives from the assumption that the primitives are not duplicated and are relatively small in
number (Hintzman, 1986; Rumelhart, 1980). It is this assumption that explains the topical coherence
of memory: To the extent that two experiences involve the same constituents, their internal
representations must involve the same subsets of primitives; because of this, the occurrence of one will
serve as a reminder of the other (through the partial activation of its memory). It is also this
assumption that provides the means for passive acquisition of abstract, generalized, or categorical
knowledge: The representations of similar precepts must, by virtue of their shared primitives, overlap
such that the occurrence of any additional instance will evoke them all; thus brought to mind in unison,
their commonalities, by sheer strength of number, will dominate their particulars. By the same means,
whole clusters and even clusters of clusters of primitives will overwrite each other as their corresponding
experiences recur. In this way, the representations for broad conceptual categories and complex
situations will accrue hierarchically as successively higher levels of overlap serve to reinforce the
commonalities among ever more general classes of experience. (As an example, one's general concept
of restaurants reflects the distributed commonalities of one's more specific concepts of cafeterias,
teahouses, and hamburger havens which, in turn, reflect the commonalities among one's individual
encounters with instances of their kind.)
The foregoing description of schema theory is necessarily top-level and, although I will add to it as
relevant, I cannot, within the scope of this paper, do justice to the breadth and depth of its development.
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The reader interested in greater detail is therefore referred to the open literature. As a good (but
rapidly aging) starting point, I recommend a chapter by Brewer and Nakamura (1984) in which major
contributions and extensions to the theory are treated from an historical perspective.
In approaching this literature, however, the reader should be warned that, ignoring the many smaller
differences between proposals, there are basically two versions of the theory. The version glossed above
is that which is generally endorsed by psychologists (e.g., Adams & Collins, 1979; Bartlett, 1932;
Rumelhart, 1980; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977). The other version, owed first to Marvin Minsky (1975),
a prominent computer scientist in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), differs significantly in its
assumption about the nature and function of abstracted knowledge. The assumption, more specifically,
is that the commonalities among a related set of concepts, procedures, or events come to be represented
in and of themselves, as abstract knowledge "frames." The interpretation of any given situation then
consists in selecting the best fitting frame against which to map it. Once the frame has been selected,
the particulars of the situation are inserted into its predefined slots, like variables, or they are forgotten.
Memory, thus, consists exactly and only of the instantiated frame that results.
In view of the nature of the AI challenge and the behavior of the AI programming language of choice
(LISP), this second version of the theory is wholly motivated and has been highly productive. From a
psychological perspective, however, it has proven untenable.
Minsky's version of the theory predicts, for example, that perceived information that is of little or no
significance to the schema or frame that dominates interpretation will be forgotten, that inferences
governed by the resting structure and content of the dominant schema or frame will be remembered as
though real, and that perceived information that conflicts with the established schema or frame will be
overridden or distorted. In fact, laboratory evidence for each of these predictions has been produced,
but not consistently. In particular, recall performance is far more vulnerable to such errors than is
recognition. (See Alba & Hasher, 1983, and Sanford & Garrod, 1981, Part 1, for reviews of such
findings.)
Such data as they suggest that schema neither gate nor merge our memories in any reliable way, and
refute the reality of the "AI version" of the theory. Yet, they are entirely consistent with the
"psychologists' version" which holds that, although everything gets into memory, schemas influence the
general ease and specific contexts with which it is likely to be retrieved. The "psychologists' version" of
the theory gains further credence as it converges with a second and highly influential set of bottom-up
memory theories known as exemplar or multi-trace memory models (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Hintzman, 1986;
Jacoby & Brooks, 1984; Kahneman & Miller, 1986; Medin & Schaeffer, 1978; Smith & Medin, 1981).
It is, moreover, the "psychologists' version" of the theory that is assumed in the present paper.
Schemas are essential to our ability to understand what we see and hear. For example, if I told you that
I had a big dog named Fido, you would, by virtue of your schema about dogs, readily infer that Fido has
four feet and fur, that he barks, that he is my pet--you would even have a pretty good notion of how big
he might be. If I told you that Kathy, for reasons of genetics, was born without feet, you would feel very
little compassion--if you knew she was a goldfish. If I told you that the man who had been sitting across
the room from me walked out without leaving any money, you would wonder what in the world I was
talking about--unless you knew I was in a restaurant.
Thus, schemas serve to organize and fill out the scant information we typically receive about the world.
They are the means by which we are able to use our knowledge and experience to make sense out of
raw ambiguity and to find significance in a gesture. But, notice: it was essential to know that Kathy was
a goldfish; it was essential to know that I was in a restaurant. The interpretive advantage of the system
depends upon your finding the appropriate schema through which to interpret the information at hand.
The goldfish and restaurant examples point up one more important feature of the system: Schemas
bundle together information that has been related in one's experience; as a consequence, they also
separate information that has not. This partitioning of memories by schemas is also generally beneficial.
To see why, let us again consider an example. Imagine that you are reading about John Dean in All
the President's Men (Woodward & Bernstein, 1976). Not once, as you read along, do you confuse "John"
with King John, Pope John, John Cage or John who was in your fourth grade class. Not once do you
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pause to wonder if his family makes pork sausages or if his brother was killed in a car accident. On
reading that John was a Baptist, you do not take him to be John the Baptist; you do not even consider
the possibility. The point is that when you are thinking within a schema, your thoughts rarely wander
to another, no matter how suggestive the cues.
Thus, we see that this partitioning of information by schemas is also crucial to cognitive coherence.
Information that has not been interrelated in your experience is not interrelated in your memory; it is
coded in separate schemas. This protects your thoughts from spurious associations and the mental chaos
that would result therefrom. In the interest of teaching for transfer, however, an unfortunate side effect
is that it also inhibits you from jumping between schemas, even when so doing would give you the most
productive edge on a problem.
All of this makes for a very persuasive argument as to why content-oriented efforts to teach thinking
skills--that is, efforts to do so in conjunction with some particular content area such as science, social
studies, or arithmetic--are unlikely to succeed. Specifically, if the thinking skills are introduced and
developed through specific content, they will, per force, be remembered, understood, and--importantly
--accessible only in relation to that content. The resulting schema will hang together as a richly
interconnected complex of knowledge about the topic. Here and there, embedded within it, will be a
variety of analytic or heuristic processes and principles. From any other domain, it may be possible to
access these processes and principles through explicit and pointed analogy. It also may not, depending
on how integrally they are encoded in terms of the content. But their spontaneous transfer cannot be
expected. If the goal of the course is to teach thinking, if it is to develop a schema that is about
thinking, then the course should very consistently and very unambiguously be about thinking.
Less obviously, perhaps, the foregoing discussion of schema theory also explains why a strictly abstract,
micrological approach is unlikely to produce transfer. Within the discourse on thinking skills, such
approaches are occasionally described as being "content-free." What is meant by this label is that the
targeted principles and processes are introduced and exercised through such materials as dot matrices,
abstract line drawings, and so on. The nature of the materials is, in turn, held to be the key to transfer:
Because the principles and processes are developed in the abstract, they should be conceptually neutral
and, therefore, equally generalizable to all applicable problem domains.
The argument sounds good, yet there must be something fundamentally wrong with it. The
disappointing transfer effects of the micrological curricula are repeated in miniature across scores of
training and transfer studies in the psychological literature.
The clue is found in the term "content-free." Can a curriculum really be content-free? The answer is
no: The content of a curriculum is the medium of instruction; it is the materials to which the targeted
processes and principles are applied; it is the materials through which they are defined and exercised.
In terms of content, the difference between content-oriented and content-free curricula is not whether
or not they have it; it is whether the content they do have consists of traditional classroom matter or,
say, abstract graphic designs of some sort. Most importantly and whichever the case, the content of the
course defines the context within which the principles and processes will be retained and through which
they may be recalled. If the goal of the course is to teach thinking and, therefore, to maximize transfer,
the materials or content through which the course is developed should reflect as diverse and broadly
useful a set of problem domains as is possible.
From schema theory, moreover, an important distinction develops between abstract knowledge and
abstracted knowledge; it is the latter that constitutes the basis for productive understanding. If what is
taught is wholly abstract, if it is removed from the context and conditions of its application, it will be
learned as an isolated structure. As such, it will not interlace with preexisting schemata and will lack
the representational microstructure through which it might be elicited in appropriate contexts. In
contrast, principles and processes become abstracted through their repeated exercise in a diversity of
contexts and problem situations. In time, as the particular instances of application overwrite each other,
their distinctive features give way to their commonalities. The idea that the power of abstract reasoning
derives from concrete experience follows not only from schema theory, but also from comparative
studies of expert/novice performance (Chi, Glaser, & Rees, 1982; Larkin, McDermott, Simon, & Simon,
Adams
Teaching Thinking - 7
1980), prominent theories of cognitive development (Ausubel, 1968; Piaget & Inhelder, 1955/1958), and
studies of the history of science (Kaput, 1979; McCloskey, 1983).
In fact, none of the programs under discussion falls cleanly into the category of abstract and
micrological. The Instrumental Enrichment program may come closest; its own developers describe it
as "content-free" (Feuerstein, Jensen, Hoffman, & Rand, 1985). Yet, integral to the full implementation
of the Instrumental Enrichment program is a process called "bridging." Each lesson in the Instrumental
Enrichment program focuses on one or two general principles, such as "A good strategy for self-checking
is to reverse an operation" or "When two stimuli are very similar, more careful analysis is needed to
distinguish the differences" (Bransford, Arbitman-Smith, Stein, & Vye, 1985, p. 188). Bridging is to
occur at the end of each lesson: It consists in having the students produce and critique examples from
their own experience that illustrate the relevant principle. Bridging is thus the key to transfer in the
Instrumental Enrichment program. Yet, relying as it does on the students' own reminiscences, it must
lack the efficiency and scope that a methodically designed set of generalization exercises could achieve.
Evaluations of the Instrumental Enrichment program indicate that it does quite well at increasing
students' nonverbal IQ scores; as a rule, however, it has not resulted in significant improvements or
transfer to general school achievement or nonschool cognitive tasks; interestingly, exceptions to this rule
tend to be had where the students' instructor for Instrumental Enrichment is also their instructor for
other coursework (Savell, Twohig, & Rachford, 1984).
Each of the other two micrological programs, Intuitive Math and Think, is built around six basic skills
(the descriptors in parenthesis are mine, added for clarity):
1. Thihgmaking (concept formation);
2. Qualification (description);
3. Classification;
4. Structure Analysis (part-whole analysis);
5. Operation Analysis (sequencing);
6. Seeing Analogies.
The goal is to enhance the students' thinking abilities by exercising these micrological skills over and
over, across a diversity of problems of graduated difficulty. The problems are mostly multiple choice,
fill-in-the-blanks, and so on. In format, they thus resemble the abstract exercises of the Instrumental
Enrichment program. However, excepting those exercises used for introducing the processes, they are
not abstract. Rather, the exercises in Intuitive Math and Think are designed to connect the basic
processes to the content and operations of conventional school subjects: mathematics and language
arts/reading, respectively. Thus, although the materials reflect a bit of a shotgun approach to content,
they do indeed include considerable content. And, because the exercises are consistently presented and
analyzed in terms of the six basic thinking skills, it is likely that the students' memory for the course will
accrue as a single grand schema.
Both Intuitive Math and Think were specially designed for remedial work with students in Grades 4 and
up and have been used quite extensively with below-norm inner-city and Chapter I populations. Each
has been shown to produce not just significant, but often very impressive growth in the average
achievement scores of recipient classrooms as measured by a variety of tests1 (California Achievement
Test, Comprehensive Test of Basic Skills, Gates MacGinitie Reading Test, Iowa Test of Basic Skills,
Metropolitan Achievement Test, and Stanford Achievement Test) (Worsham & Austin, 1983; Zenke &
Alexander, 1984).
In contrast with the micrological approaches, the macrological generally avoid the abstract. Instead, it
is through a diversity of face-valid materials and the repeated application of the targeted principles and
processes to them, that the macrological approaches seek to maximize transfer.
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From the perspective of schema theory, this sounds like the right approach. Nonetheless, for the two
most extensively used macrological programs, deBono's CoRT and Covington et al.'sProductive Thinking,
evidence of transfer, as measured by improvements on standardized tests, is hard to come by (see
Mansfield, Busse, & Krepelka, 1978, and Nickerson, Perkins, & Smith, 1985, for summaries).
There is, on the other hand, a stand out among the macrological curricula. This is Lipman's Philosophy
for Children. Evaluations of this program with middle school (grades 4-8) children have repeatedly
shown it to produce significant gains in reading comprehension and/or logical thinking (see Lipman,
1985, for a summary).
Three explanations might be offered for the effectiveness of Lipman's program as compared to its
macrological cousins. First, it is a bit of a hybrid on the micro-macro dimension. Lipman argues that
higher order thinking skills are not essentially different from the basic or lower order logical processes.
They are instead but concatenations of the lower order processes, ways of using them "collaboratively
and concertedly" to higher order ends (1984, p. 55). In keeping with this, the processes and principles
covered in Philosophy for Children move progressively from the simpler to the complex, and, to clarify
the simpler processes, many of the accompanying exercises are quite abstract. Despite intentions,
however, Lipman is nowhere explicit about the identities of the basic processes, and the exercises
designed to enhance them lack something in the way of clear or methodical progression. The program
is centered upon and strongest with respect to the macrological end of the continuum.
The second possible explanation for the relative effectiveness of Philosophy for Children relates to its
focal reading materials. The reading material, for each course in the program, is a novel: a single, well-
written book about the continuing episodes of a small set of major characters with complex but
consistent personalities. According to Lipman, the power of this medium is the imaginal invitation of
fiction; the student comes to know the characters and their world in a deep sense, to identify and
sympathize with them and, thereby, to truly participate in their adventure in thinking about thinking.
Lipman is surely correct, yet there may be another feature of the use of novels that is at least as
important. It gives Lipman the freedom to introduce, reintroduce, and elaborate each logical process
across a diversity of real-world situations, simultaneously ensuring that all such instances will be
remembered together, in the single evolving schema for the novel as a whole. In short, Lipman's
courses are designed to build upon themselves both thematically and (though with a little more entropy)
logically. In combination, these two features must enhance the likelihood that the resulting product, in
the student's mind, will be a single, contextually rich but thematically integrated and logically well-
articulated schema. From the perspective of schema theory, this would be the ideal.
The third explanation for the success of Philosophy for Children is less interesting than the others, but
cannot be overlooked. Specifically, the program seems best suited for scholastically solid, culturally
mainstream classrooms. Sternberg comments that "students from lower-class and even lower middle-
class backgrounds might have trouble relating to the stories" (1984, p. 44). Further, the novels would
lose at least interest and cohesion except in the hands of fairly good readers. And finally, the program
demands a degree of philosophical sophistication, confidence, and mental agility that may be difficult
for any but the best teachers to master. It follows, regrettably, that Philosophy for Children is probably
not among the best options for widespread Chapter I implementation.
To summarize, I have argued on the basis of theory that for purposes of maximizing transfer, a course
on thinking skills should result in a single, well-integrated schema. The schema must be centered on
the principles and processes the course was intended to develop, and it must be richly and diversely
elaborated with concrete or real-world instances of application. Consistently, from the evaluation data,
I have shown that the programs yielding the strongest evidence of transfer are precisely those which best
meet these theoretically designated criteria.
Through the discussion of the evaluation data, an additional set of variables has also suggested itself.
Specifically, of the more successful programs, none was strictly macrological, and none was strictly
micrological; none depended solely on abstract exercises, but all employed them from time to time. Is
a mixed approach truly better, or is this a coincidence? This question will be addressed in the next
section where consideration is turned to the issue of individual differences.
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Before moving on, however, I would like to address a lurking caveat. Every one of the programs
producing positive results on standardized tests can be criticized on the grounds that it includes exercises
resembling the problems on standardized tests. Conversely, Productive Thinking and CoRT, the two
programs producing least evidence of transfer as measured by such tests, are also the two most devoid
of test-like exercises. For both Productive Thinking and CoRT, experimental or taught students have
been shown to exceed controls in ideational fluency on problems similar to those found in the respective
curricula. The effects of Productive Thinking have been particularly well researched, often demonstrating
gains not just in the quantity of ideas students generate, but further in the quality of their ideas and in
their intellectual independence and self-confidence (Covington, 1985; Poison & Jeffries, 1985).
The point is that transfer is a grey scale. Its ultimate metric is decidedly not performance on any
particular set of test items, standardized or not. On the other hand, true thinking uncontainably
promotes learning, understanding, and more thinking. It thus follows that there is one best measure of
the success of such a course. That measure would assess whether impact of the course increases with
time, whether students who received the course continue to outlearn, outperform, and "outadjust" their
peers who did not. On this question, there is unfortunately very little data (but see Feuerstein, 1980,
and Lipman, 1976).
Individual Differences
The second problem besetting courses on thinking skills is that many seem to work only with certain
students. For programs that work best with the better students, the problem is obvious: Chapter I
students tend not to be the better students. However, any insensitivity to individual differences takes
on more global import when the target population consists of Chapter I students. Specifically, as a
group, better students tend to be relatively homogeneous in terms of general knowledge and school
skills; they are deemed good students, after all, by virtue of the fact that they have learned, with
reasonable consistency and alacrity, that which has been taught. The same is not true of low achieving
students; whether quick or slow, and they may be either, their defining characteristic is that their school
skills and knowledge fall short of grade expectations in one or more domains. It follows that the most
promising program for Chapter I implementation will not be geared to either the best or the worst.
Rather, to be successful, it must be appropriate across a broad and complex space of individual
differences.
This point spells immediately into yet another argument for teaching thinking skills separately rather
than as an adjunct to any conventional content area. That is, to think about history, a student must first
know a certain amount of history; to read critically, a student must first read at a certain level; etc.
Because they offer their developers so much freedom in selecting and structuring content and materials,
process-oriented approaches offer a medium that can be relatively free of such impediments. Process-
oriented approaches are therefore your best bet if the students to whom you would like to teach thinking
skills are either young or low achievers. Process-oriented approaches are also your best bet if the
students differ from one another in their entry levels of achievement--and, do note: pull-out or not, they
always do.
Of the macrological programs, effective use of Philosophy for Children is, as mentioned above, practically
restricted to better classrooms. Similarly, Productive Thinking has been used most frequently and
successfully with above average students (Chance, 1986; Covington, 1985).
Indeed, of the macrological programs, CoRT alone claims equal usability and success across high ability,
low ability, and mixed ability groups (deBono, 1985). The wider usability of deBono's program is owed
to the nature of his materials. They consist of problems that have no correct answers, but whose proper
airing may involve consideration of a number of factors and points of view, all of which should be
available through common sense and common knowledge. Examples of these problems include, "What
makes a TV or radio program interesting?" "Mail services lost a lot of money. If you were running
these services, what alternatives might you suggest?" and "A father forbids his 13-year-old daughter to
smoke. What is his point of view and what is hers?" (deBono, 1985). The purpose of the problems is
to exercise CoRT's "tools" or thinking principles. The CoRT program includes 60 named principles
although, as mentioned earlier, there is considerable redundancy among them. In the main, the
principles are directed towards brainstorming, suspending judgment while brainstorming, identifying the
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positive, negative, and interesting or unusual features of the brainstormed ideas, recognizing different
points of view, and putting it all together. In class, the principles are named but not defined except by
way of the teacher's chosen examples. For the core of each lesson, the students are divided into groups
of four or five. Within these groups, they discuss each problem, giving special attention to the tool of
the day. Then the groups report their ideas to the class as a whole. In short, the lessons pivot on
appealing problems that involve no reading, no writing, no specialized knowledge, and no wrong
answers--just talk, and all kinds of people love to talk. Hence, its universal usability.
But what about its success? deBono eschews standardized tests--"they are not sensitive to the range of
thinking skills in which the CoRT program offers instruction" (deBono, 1985, p. 382). He prefers tests
of his own devising, testimonials, and examples. Here is an example:
I was once teaching a demonstration class of 10-year-old children in Sydney, Australia. I asked
them whether they would like to be given $5 a week for attending school. All 30 of them liked
the idea and gave their reasons for doing so (buy sweets, chewing gum, comics, etc.). I then
introduced the idea of the PMI [a CoRT tool] and asked them to apply this to the suggestion,
working in groups of five. After 4 minutes, I asked for their output. They raised the following
kinds of issues: Parents would stop pocket money, schools would increase charges, bigger boys
would beat up smaller ones--and where would the money come from? Twenty-nine out of the
30 had now completely reversed their opinion. This was without any suggestion from me as to
which considerations they should bring to mind. This example illustrates the purpose of CoRT
thinking: the use of a simple perceptual framework to bring about a conclusion through
exploring the experience in a more thorough manner (deBono, 1985, pp. 385-386).
I have to say that I am underwhelmed by the quality of thought shown in such examples.
I have seen the CoRT program in action. I was highly impressed with the enthusiasm and the mental
activity it provoked in the classroom, and am comfortable with the idea that it generally does so. I
believe that the CoRT program may exert a strong effect on the attitudes of low achievers, that it may
give them a genuine sense of their own permission to think. Such an outcome can only be considered
invaluable and should not be downplayed. On the other hand, I remain skeptical about the extent to
which the program hones its students' critical or analytic abilities.
The CoRT program aside, it is the micrological courses, Instrumental Enrichment, Think, and Intuitive
Math, that have been used most often and most successfully with low achieving students. I suspect that
the apparent advantage of the micrological over the macrological programs with this population is real
and derives from the characteristic difference in materials as well as structure. Turning first to
materials, all of the micrological programs rely on abstract materials at least for introductory purposes.
At a cognitive level, there are two advantages to such materials. First, they offer a means by which the
targeted processes and principles can be explicated and exercised without presuming any specialized
background knowledge on the part of the students; again, this feature has special merit when the
students are of low or mixed achievement levels. Second, abstract exercises, as they are relatively
meaningless by definition, remove the conceptual distraction potentiated by content-rich exercises. They
thus allow for the instructional exchange (and the resulting memories of it) to be unambiguously focused
on the processes and principles at issue.
In terms of structure, the salient aspect of the micrological approaches is that they include explicit
instruction and labeling of the micrological principles and processes. Because of this, they are prepared
with both the conceptual and terminological scaffolding to analyze and discuss the macrological issues
explicitly when they do arise. This is seen as an advantage on two dimensions. First, it provides the
necessary components for sound direct instruction. The definitive feature of direct instruction, whether
achieved through guided practice, modeling, Socratic Inquiry, or discussion, consists in the explicit
treatment of the substeps of a thought process and of the considerations pertaining to when and why
each of those substeps is appropriate. Instruction of this kind is widely held to be an especially effective
means of developing students' appreciation of the intellectual processes as opposed to the contentive
products of a discipline (Anderson, Hiebert, Scott, & Wilkinson, 1985; Pintrich, Cross, Kozma, &
McKeachie, 1986; Rosenshine, 1986). Without explicitly addressing the substeps of a complex process,
the best the macrological approaches can offer is indirect requirements for their exercise (see deBono,
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1985). Second, the explicit articulation of the microprocesses, first by themselves and later as
components of more complex or concrete challenges, should lead to a stronger core as well as richer
and thus more traversable interrelations in the schema the students develop.
Even so, an equally strong but different case can be made for both macrological and content-oriented
approaches, especially as they build upon information of real-world and scholastic relevance. The strong
proponents of this case are cognitive psychologists, and the reason for their adamancy came as somewhat
of a surprise to themselves. For the last 25 years, the field of cognitive psychology has been devoted to
understanding the nature and limits of people's intelligent behaviors. Until very recently, the research
has been focused all but exclusively on all-purpose processing modes and capabilities. Then, due to a
variety of forces--the influence of computer scientists in the field of artificial intelligence, the resistance
of language to being usefully modeled in the abstract, the uncontrollable influence of semantics on
memory phenomena--researchers began to attend to the effect of knowledge on their experiments
instead of trying to cancel it out.
The results have been persuasively summarized by Robert Glaser (1984). In essence, the various
processing modes and capabilities that had already been postulated were reaffirmed; they were every
bit present and generally behaved as expected in these new, knowledge-rich, experimental designs. The
exception was that they differed negligibly across individuals: Whether comparing experts and novices
in some domain, high and low scorers on aptitude tests, or even adults and children, the differences in
performance proved due, most of all, to differences in knowledge.
The findings on the relationship between knowledge and performance have constituted major support
for the theory of schemas. In particular, results such as those just described virtually force the
conclusion that improvement in cognitive skills . . .
. ..takes place through the exercise of conceptual and procedural knowledge in the context of
specific knowledge domains. Learning and reasoning skills develop not as abstract mechanisms
of heuristic search and memory processing. Rather, they develop as the content and concepts
of a knowledge domain are attained in learning situations that constrain this knowledge to serve
certain purposes and goals. Effective thinking is the result of 'conditionalized' knowledge--
knowledge that becomes associated with the conditions and constraints of its use. (Glaser, 1984,
p. 99)
A large proportion of the Chapter I population is comprised of children who, for reasons of ethnicity,
poverty, or parental education, fall outside the mainstream culture of our society. The implication of
these issues for such children is so important that it bears restatement.
Cognitive theory and research indicate that the way in which we perceive and interpret our worlds
depends most of all on the worlds we have experienced in the past. Our minds can be described as the
organized memories of whatever we have experienced, either consciously or tacitly. Thinking,
understanding, and learning can be described as processes of retrieving or constructing interrelations
among subsets of our knowledge that coherently model the phenomena under consideration.
If this view is correct, then cross-cultural differences in achievement are to be expected. Our knowledge
must vary at several different levels with the culture in which we live. At the most basic level, the
phenomenal world may differ markedly across cultures, and even where it overlaps, the full or
contextually elaborated meanings of particular objects or events may nonetheless differ significantly. To
this extent, our direct knowledge of the world, both simple and complex, will be culture specific. Our
cultural environment also influences the kinds of knowledge we are likely to gain through vicarious
experiences. Culture shapes not only the topics but the social functions of the oral language around us.
Further it determines the nature and availability of other sources of vicarious experience, such as books,
newspapers, and television programs.
Thus, our cultural environments are strong determiners of the kinds of experiences to which we are
haphazardly exposed. In addition, however, there are social differences between cultures which must
affect our cognitive development in a more systematic way. Specifically, cultures differ in the uses they
make of thinking and knowledge. This impacts not only on the kinds of thinking and learning a culture
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fosters, but also on the attitudes it fosters toward thinking and learning. In a technologically
sophisticated society, thinking and learning are prize commodities. They are highly valued both socially
and on the marketplace and, like other prize commodities, are sought in their own right. That is, the
technological society carries an atmosphere that is not only conducive to thinking and learning but,
further, to thinking and learning about thinking and learning.
Our educational system is both the product and promoter of this cultural syndrome. It is our
institutionalized best effort to provide for our children within the system--to pass on our culturally
endorsed fortunes, as it were. We have designed our formal educational system to expand and elaborate
on those skills and values which our children have, in any case, been reared to accept and pursue. By
opening the educational system to children with different backgrounds, we offer to them the opportunity
to move into and up in our social structure. The problem is that to the extent children lack the
knowledge and values that the system presumes, it must be extremely difficult for them to assimilate
those which it offers.
A good course on thinking skills would be an invaluable boost for such children. Ideally, it would give
them the critical, analytic, and organizational abilities and attitudes to make the most of the information
they do have and will be exposed to. But, for maximum impact, the course must be content-rich. For
Chapter I students, the provision of content is of utmost importance in itself; it is a fact of intellectual
life, that the more you know, the more you learn. Further, harkening back to the section on transfer,
the content provides the links through which the learned thinking skills will be activated and applied to
issues and challenges encountered beyond the boundaries of the course itself.
Returning to the programs with an eye toward the issue of individual differences, Think and Intuitive
Math seem the best choices for Chapter I implementation. They are structured for assimilation by low
achievers, and their content has been carefully contrived to connect to and enhance the students'
performance in language arts and math, respectively.
On the short side, these two programs might be criticized for relying too much on short-format
exercises. One negative of this spoon-sized delivery system is that the exercises are occasionally found
to be simplistic, repetitive, and boring (although the harder exercises are reported to be exciting)
(Toczynski, 1984). Another is that by relying on short-format exercises, which are inherently limited in
complexity or dimensionality, the program moves too little toward the dialectical and macrological skills
that support more general intellectual independence rather than just grade-level studentship. Moreover,
the programs might be criticized for being too closely tied to the academic regimen they seek to enhance
and, in particular, to the basic skills of those regimen. Of particular relevance within this section, the
two programs are by no means indifferent to students' entry levels of achievement. Nor, I suspect, could
they be, given their concentration on the remediation of domain-specific skills. Instead the programs
are deliberately tailored to students' entry levels of achievement. Each has been developed across a
series of levels, and Innovation Sciences, Inc., provides pretests for determining the most appropriate
level for any given group of students. In keeping with this, the programs appear most successful under
a statistical lens: They very often advance the average test scores of the classes with whom they are
implemented. However, whether for reasons of pretesting error or nonuniversal assumptions about the
sorts of skills students need, there are inevitably individuals within groups and occasionally whole groups
of students for whom the programs produce little or no measurable impact. These drawbacks aside,
Think and Intuitive Math look quite attractive for Chapter I purposes. On average, they do seem to arm
students with not just the basic skills but, further, the basic understanding and attitude to move on.
Usability by Teachers
The third limitation, that of how easily the course can be implemented, is not a direct problem for
Chapter I students. Indirectly, however, it is critical. To invest in their widespread dissemination and,
thereby, to gamble the time and money they require, we should expect the curricula to be usable and
effective in the hands of whichever teachers draw the straw. And we should expect them to be so
without requiring undue time for lesson preparation and management in or out of class.
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The profession of a teacher is teaching. A good teacher is invaluable precisely for her or his ability to
understand, manage, and communicate with students. A well-designed curriculum should support those
efforts, not divert them.
I would argue that it is fundamentally irresponsible for a curriculum to list major activities while
expecting teachers to invent the materials or the substance of the lessons for getting them done. Of
course, there are teachers who like to design their own lessons and materials. Of course, every teacher
occasionally runs across materials, topics, or ideas that she or he wants to add to the lesson plan. Of
course, all teachers regularly modify and adapt curriculum materials to best suit the interests and
abilities of their own students.
However, one should not expect teachers to produce the bulk of their instructional materials any more
than one expects medical doctors to invent medicines, actors to direct their own movies, or Presidents
to write their own speeches from scratch. To be sure, there are some teachers, doctors, actors, and
Presidents who do such things. But whether they do them is really quite independent of how well they
carry out the challenges of their principal profession.
By extension of this position, I would further argue that a well-designed curriculum should not require
large amounts of inservice training. A heavy inservice requirement is inconsiderate of teachers' time and
school budgets. And worse, it is a symptom that the success of the curriculum depends not on the
guidance and materials it provides, but on the individual efforts of teachers to interpret and go beyond
what it provides.
The considerateness of curriculum materials is even more important if the topic of the course is new.
When designing a curriculum in a traditional domain, such as grammar or geography, one can afford
to be a little sloppier: Teachers will readily fill in the gaps, drawing on their own prior coursework and
knowledge of the domain. In contrast, most teachers have not had many courses on thinking skills. To
the extent that a curriculum on thinking skills is not self-contained and comprehensible, it would be
almost reasonable for teachers to throw up their hands and quit it.
Of the curricula under consideration, both Philosophy for Children and Instrumental Enrichment require
lots--on the order of weeks and months--of teacher training, and the outcomes of each appear highly
sensitive to teacher variables. For the CoRT program, teacher training is recommended, but deemed
unnecessary; on the other hand, even deBono (1985) acknowledges that the success of the lessons must
be highly dependent on the teachers' style and mental flexibility. Other than reading through the
appropriate sections of the Teacher's Guide prior to each lesson, Productive Thinking requires no special
preparation of teachers; but again, its effectiveness seems to be quite sensitive to individual teacher
variables. Finally, both Think and Intuitive Math suggest one week of pretraining for teachers, although
effective use of the program by regular classroom teachers has been reported after as little as one day
of preparation (Worsham & Austin, 1983). There is a trade-off here: In lieu of being training intensive,
both Think and Intuitive Math are materials intensive. The implementation of these two programs
requires purchase of a package including such things as individual student workbooks, "moderator
guides" including teacher scripts and answer pages, response pads, tape cassettes, student progress
records, and red, white, and blue counters.
One More Program: Odyssey
I turn now to a new program entitled Odyssey: A Curriculum for Thinking (M. Adams, 1986). The
program was developed through a collaborative effort of Bolt Beranek and Newman, Harvard University,
and the Venezuelan Ministry of Education. The project was funded by Petroleos of Venezuela and
sponsored by Dr. Luis Alberto Machado, then Minister for the Development of Human Intelligence of
the Republic of Venezuela. I give the program special attention not just because it is our own but
further because (a) it was designed and implemented in the face of exaggerated forms of virtually every
curriculum-breaking problem one might imagine, (b) it is structurally unique, embodying the theoretical
desiderata for which I have argued in this paper, and (c) it worked as measured through a relatively
large-scale and rigorous evaluation effort.
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Problems Confronted
The experimental implementation and evaluation of the program was conducted solely in Venezuelan
"barrio" schools, a designation indicating that the students came from homes with low social-economic
status and minimal parental education. The course was administered exclusively to seventh grade
classes, but the students ranged from 10.6 to 17 years of age. The students, moreover, differed at least
as widely from one another in school skills, general knowledge, motivation, social behavior and virtually
any other relevant dimension one might name. The teachers with whom we worked ranged from very
marginal to excellent, and we knew this would be true of the teachers who might be asked to use the
curriculum in the future. Because the goal was to develop a course that could be widely disseminated
in Venezuela in our absence, it had to be self-contained; it had to be designed such that it would be
usable without extensive teacher training and such that it would resist deleterious transformations in
transmission. Finally, because of the funding system in the schools, we knew that future use of the
course in Venezuela would be generally precluded unless the associated materials were inexpensive to
purchase.
Curriculum Design
Odyssey is, relative to the previously discussed programs, a come-lately effort. This was a tremendous
advantage in terms of defining its structure, as we had both the wisdom of hindsight on previous efforts
and the benefit of contemporary theory and research in education and cognitive psychology.
From the outset, our challenge in writing the Odyssey curriculum was defined. We sought the focus,
analytical force, and pedagogical range of the micrological approaches; we wanted to convey, very
explicitly, both the nature of the basic processes and their interrelationships; and we wanted to reach
the least advanced students without losing the most advanced. We sought the epistemological leverage
of the content-oriented approaches: We knew our thinking skills had to be thoroughly enmeshed in
conceptual knowledge of direct scholastic or real-world relevance. We sought the intellectual complexity
and dialectical reflection of the macrological approaches. And we wanted the skills we taught to
transfer, to be recalled and applied to whatever amenable challenges the students might encounter
beyond the confines of the curriculum itself. To meet this challenge, we exploited the theory of schemas
and developed a content-rich but process-centered design within which the macrological is systematically
built upon the micrological.
Before delving further into Odyssey's design, a pair of studies by Gick and Holyoak (1980, 1983) may
be especially instructive. In their first study (1980), Gick and Holyoak set out to assess the way in which
people's familiarity with the solution to one problem influences their approach to a second. As their
target problem, Gick and Holyoak chose a medical problem (from Duncker, 1945) which very few
people (fewer than 10% in Gick and Holyoak's sample) tend to solve without any help. To demonstrate
transfer, subjects were asked to solve the medical problem immediately after reading and memorizing
a story that described the setting and solution to a logically analogous but semantically different
problem. As expected, this procedure produced an increase in the number of subjects who eventually
generated correct solutions to the medical problem. Yet, the transfer effect was disappointingly weak:
A few subjects seemed to capitalize on the guidance provided by the priming story spontaneously;
however, the majority did so only after the experimenters provided a directive hint as to the relevance
of the priming story; and, even with this hint, a significant number of subjects never produced the
solution. This basic pattern of results held whether subjects had been asked to work with the priming
story before being given the medical problem or only after they were stuck on the medical problem.
It also held whether they had been asked to read and recall the priming story or had actually solved it
themselves. Furthermore, not even the hint helped much unless the priming story was very similar to
the medical problem in structure.
Overall, then, Gick and Holyoak's first study (1980) demonstrated that their subjects (a) generally failed
to notice the analogical relationship between the problems on their own, and (b) had trouble recognizing
the relationship even when told that it was there. In view of this, Gick and Holyoak's second study
(1983) was directed toward finding a way to overcome such resistance.
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To this end, Gick and Holyoak (1983) first tried providing subjects with either an explicit statement or
a graphic representation of the solution principle. But, whether these aids were presented in isolation
or in conjunction with the priming story and its solution, the majority of subjects still failed to solve the
medical problem without the hint.
Next, Gick and Holyoak tried giving the subjects two different study analogies prior to the medical
problem while asking them, not to recall the individual stories, but to write a summary of the similarities
between them. This procedure seemed to work a bit better: About 45% of the subjects solved the
medical problem with no hint, as opposed to about 30% in the conditions involving a single story plus
the principle or diagram. With the hint, as in virtually all of the previously described conditions, about
80% succeeded.
Finally, Gick and Holyoak applied brute force. Again subjects were given two different priming stories
with the instructions to write a summary of their similarities but, this time, appended to the end of each
of the stories and in identical wording, was an explicit statement of the solution principal. At last, the
majority (62%) of the subjects demonstrated spontaneous transfer, solving the medical problem with no
hint. With the hint, another 20% did so, such that the total success rate again equaled about 80%.
Gick and Holyoak repeated the latter procedure once more, this time varying the similarity of the two
priming stories to each other. In addition, the explicit statement of the solution principle was either
eliminated or substituted with a graphic representation. Without the graphic aid, performance fell to
the level of earlier experiments. With the graphic aid, however, the majority of the subjects again solved
the medical problem with no need of a hint: 62% with priming stories that were very similar to each
other and 53% with priming stories that were not. Given the hint, moreover, virtually all of these
subjects (92%) succeeded.
To better understand the mechanism for such transfer, Gick and Holyoak analyzed the subjects' written
comparisons of the two priming stories for the completeness with which they described a schema for the
logical structure of their solution. It is from these analyses that the real force of the study derives.
Specifically, even among those subjects who produced poor schemas, a certain number proceeded to
solve the medical problem. However, and regardless of the experimental condition, virtually every one
of the subjects whose summary included a good description of the solution schema, proceeded to solve
the medical problem with no need of a hint. The probability with which subjects generated a good
solution schema was increased by the provision of either the statement of the principle or its graphic
representation, and was highest when one of these aids was presented in conjunction with two priming
stories that were superficially dissimilar from each other.
From these results, we may infer that there exist two different types of transfer. The first, which we will
term direct transfer, involves a direct mapping from one problem-solving situation to another and is
enhanced by the superficial similarity between the problems and the provision of a hint. As valuable
as direct transfer might be, it is highly dependent upon context and, by implication, cannot be trainable
in any generally and robustly useful way. The second type of transfer, which we will term mediated
transfer, is enhanced by the superficial dissimilarity among the training problems and by the provision
of such aids as statements of principle and abstract diagrams. Mediated transfer may transcend
superficial differences between problem situations since the edge on a novel problem is gained not
through direct mapping to the training problems but through mapping to the principles and procedures
that have been abstracted from those training problems. It is mediated transfer that we seek to promote
through the Odyssey curriculum and, consistent with Gick and Holyoak's studies, we pursue this goal
through brute force: The concepts and processes that the students are to abstract are developed across
a diversity of exercises and thought-provoking challenges, and they are verbally summarized, graphically
supported, and consistently labeled throughout.
In overview, the curriculum we produced consists of six Lesson Series or books. Each Lesson Series is
divided into two or more Units, representing subtopics. The Units themselves are comprised of three
or more 1-hour lessons. Table 1 provides a list of Series and Units and, in parentheses, the number of
lessons in each Unit. The table also includes brief descriptions of some of the main objectives of each
Unit.
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[Insert Table 1 about here.]
In the first Lesson Series, Foundations of Reasoning (Adams, Buscaglia, deSanchez, & Swets, 1986),
each of our targeted thinking skills is introduced through the sorts of abstract teaching materials typical
of micrological approaches. Then, through the balance of the course, these same thinking skills are
used, and thereby refined, elaborated and contextualized, over and over again, as the means of
developing the various macrological and domain-specific challenges of each of the other Lesson Series.
Our basic position in designing the curriculum was that thinking, in any domain, involves two basic
components: information and interpretation. We therefore designed the course so as to develop a set
of processes, concepts, strategies, and attitudes that would support the reflective, methodical, and
productive exploitation of these two components.
Of these, it is the processes that serve as the backbone of the course. That is, it is the processes that
are to unify 4nd empower the grand schema that the course is meant to instill in the students. At the
first level or very core of this schema is the process of analyzing information in terms of dimensions
(e.g., color) and characteristics or values on those dimensions (e.g., red, blue, green). Around this core,
we built four "first-order" processes: classification, hierarchical classification, sequencing, and analogical
reasoning. These are called first-order processes because they are in fact nothing more than structures
for comparing characteristics within or between selected dimensions.
Thus, the design of the course consisted, first, in explicitly and methodically developing the process of
dimensional analysis. Upon that, we explicitly and methodically developed the four first-order processes.
And, finally, upon those, we explicitly and methodically developed as diverse a set of content-specific and
intellectually complex extensions as we could squeeze in. As examples, paragraphs are treated as classes
of ideas, and larger text structures as hierarchies. Metaphors, allegories, and families of logical and
mathematical word problems are analyzed in terms of the implied dimensions of comparison, explicitly
identifying the underlying analogies. Complex decisions are undertaken by identifying the dimensions
along which the choices differ from one another and then by ordering their characteristics by preference
and their dimensions by importance. And, moving toward the dialectic, students are given considerable
exercise in identifying the underlying assumptions and implicit information in text; in analyzing the logic
and assessing the nature and function of argument in exposition as well as debate; in identifying the
goals and points of view of authors and of the characters in stories; in evaluating and redesigning or
rewriting inventions, procedures, and information from different perspectives; in revising opinions; and
in compiling, interpreting, and evaluating information on complex, ill-structured problems. Through
these excursions, we hoped to extend the core processes with the particular conditions and constraints
required to make them appropriate to a variety of scholastic and real-world applications.
While structured on process, the curriculum is also rich in concepts. Many of these are specific to a
particular domain of application (e.g., antonyms, synonyms, and propositional terms) or to the particular
content through which an application is developed (e.g., ballast, adherence, and googol). Moreover, we
did not shy from introducing new information to the students. To the contrary, within each domain of
application, we made an effort to construct examples and exercises that were both rich and diverse in
content. The goal was to make the process-schema rich in knowledge, to maximize the variety of
contexts from which it might be spontaneously accessed.
Importantly, there are also a few concepts that are methodically raised and elaborated in every Lesson
Series. Each of these core concepts deals with some aspect of the nature and quality of the information
available for interpretation. They include the concepts of explicit versus implicit information, certain
versus pr obabilistic or suggestive information, positive versus negative information, relative versus
absolute information, relevance, consistency, credibility, goals, and point of view.
A number of strategies are also developed and used throughout the course. As examples, these include
working backwards, the process of elimination, searching for counterexamples, systematic trial and error,
and constructing tabular or graphic representations. The essential characteristic of strategies is that they
help guide the search for or organization of information. They thus differ from processes in that they
play no direct or necessary role in solving a problem. On the other hand, used methodically, they can
make the solution of a problem much, much easier.
Adams
Teaching Thinking - 17
Finally, the course is intended to instill certain attitudes or modes of learning and thinking in the
students. These include, for example, a healthy appreciation of knowledge and the rewards of self-
discipline, a willingness to explore and analyze information, a readiness to critique one's beliefs and
point of view, a strong notion that the structure of everything, from pencils to literary genre, reflects its
intended function, and most of all, the conviction that--whatever it is--it can be understood. We tried
to reinforce these attitudes at every possible opportunity.
Against such claims, it is appropriate to provide a fuller picture of Odyssey's structure and content. To
this end, I will briefly describe how the process of dimensional analysis is introduced, how it is used to
develop the logic of the first-order processes, and how combinations of those basic processes are then
used to develop an analytic approach to a sampling of the higher-order challenges in the curriculum.
Introduction and dimension analysis. The ability to parse the world into elementary characteristics and
the dimensions of variation to which they pertain is foundational to physics, mathematics, formal logic,
and, moreover, virtually all formal disciplines. Odyssey is built upon the premise that such explicit
analysis is of foundational utility for cogent thinking in any domain. On this view, characteristics and
dimensions are introduced at the very start of the course.
More specifically, the course begins with the thought that everything that any one of us has learned has
been learned in one of two ways: directly, through our own observations and experience, or indirectly,
as conveyed or described by others. These others have, on their part, gained the information they
convey either directly, through their own observations, or indirectly, by way of still others. As the
analysis is extended, the point is ultimately forced that whatever we know or can know must be based
on somebody's direct observations. It follows, therefore, that in the abilities to conduct, interpret, and
pass on our observations carefully and accurately, lie the seeds of human knowledge.
The students are next challenged to describe things. Inevitably, they do so characteristic by
characteristic, such as this thing is small, white, and round (spherical); it's light; it bounces; and it's used
for playing ping-pong. From there, it is easy to get the students to produce reasons why it might also
be a good idea to observe things in a characteristic by characteristic manner. But, of course, having
made and justified the suggestion themselves, many students are naturally convinced that it is obvious
or even banal; it is what they always do and do quite well. Lest this be the end of useful discussion from
their point of view, we proceed to confront them with a series of faulty illustrations (see Figure 1).
Their challenge is to determine what is wrong in each. While the task is one of straightforward
observation, it is, by design, sufficiently easy that everyone succeeds with most of the drawings but
sufficiently difficult that virtually no one succeeds with all. The students thus leave the first lesson with
the motivating discovery that their own observational powers are perhaps not quite as good as they
might be. They also leave the lesson with an introduction to the nature of characteristics, to the genre
of interactive exchanges and structured discovery through which the course will evolve, and most
importantly, with a sense of where the course is going--it is to be about information and interpretation:
the substance and process of thinking.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
The next several lessons are ostensibly directed to the process of comparison. Their purpose is to
introduce the concept of dimensions. As is typical of the course and necessary for the coherent
conceptual growth it seeks, the first of these lessons is begun with an exercise designed to recall and
review the central ideas of its predecessor: The students are asked to describe or list the characteristics
of an object depicted in their workbook. They are then given a second drawing and asked to describe
how it differs from the first. The basic concept of a dimension follows directly and concretely as the
students are led to discover that their comparisons follow a system: characteristics are compared in
kind--color with color, shape with shape, height with height, and so on.
The balance of these lessons is directed toward reinforcing the concepts of dimensions and
characteristics and extending them beyond the simple perceptual domain. The students are given a
variety of exercises in identifying and naming dimensions and characteristics. In addition, when the
comparison process is shifted from differences to similarities, the critical notion of relative description
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is introduced: Whether or not two items are adjudged to be similar depends upon the purpose and field
of comparison.
The first-order processes. The remainder of the first Lesson Series is principally devoted to developing
the four first-order processes: simple classification, ordering, hierarchical classification, and analogies.
Again, each of these processes is but a structured means for relating characteristics within and between
dimensions.
Simple classification consists in selecting a dimension of interest and then grouping objects or
information according to their similarities and differences on that dimension. Thus, beyond the concepts
and processes involved in dimensional analysis, simple classification requires little more than the
recognition that any set of objects can alternately be classified or grouped according to their similarities
and differences along as many dimensions as they can be described (see Figure 2). To support this
point, the lessons on classification provide exercise in classifying sets of abstract and familiar items in
multiple ways and in articulating the dimensions and characteristics governing given classifications.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
The last lesson of the Unit is on hypothesis-testing and is built upon the sorts of conceptual formation
problems (owed to Hovland, 1952) that have become so familiar in both classroom packages and the
psychological literature. The problem shown in Figure 3 illustrates how structured discovery is deployed
to strengthen the impact of these problems. Specifically, the problem shown in Figure 3 is
indeterminate; as it happens, the essential characteristic of "tweegles" is that they have feathers. This
problem is presented well into the exercise set and, thus, only after the students have become quite facile
in solving its determinate cousins. The purpose of the problem is to make forceful the previously
discussed notion that positive information or positive instances of a concept are essential for purposes
of formulating a set of candidate hypotheses. A similarly indeterminate problem, including only positive
instances of a concept, is provided to establish the critical and delimiting function of negative
information. Having been caught by these two problems, the students are better prepared and motivated
to approach the remainder of the exercise set with the analytic attitude it is intended to develop.
Furthermore, the distinct functions of positive and negative information will reemerge time and again,
especially in lessons within the Verbal Reasoning (Nickerson & Adams, in press), Problem Solving
(Grignetti, 1986), and Decision Making (Feehrer & Adams, 1986) Series.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
Ordering is the process of discovering, not commonalities in the characteristics of a group of items, but
commonalities in the differences between them. Can the items be arranged such that their
characteristics along some specified dimensions are consistently increasing (decreasing, alternating, or
cycling)? And, if so, how do the characteristics on other dimensions of interest then pattern themselves?
The introduction to the Unit is built upon problems requiring extrapolation of sequences. Because the
problems presented for independent seatwork follow a multiple-choice format (see Figure 4), the logic
and procedures they require is basically the same as that involved in classification or concept
identification with a significant exception: The students are additionally required to identify the nature
of the sequence as progressive, alternating, or cyclical.
[Insert Figure 4 about here.]
The students are next introduced to the concept of an orderable dimension (e.g., height, weight,
numerosity) and given a variety of exercises and simple orderings designed to force consideration of
subtended issues of symmetry, reflectivity, transitivity, and connectivity. The exercises in the Unit are
diverse, allowing the students to explore the mnemonic value of ordering, the interpretability it lends to
tables and graphs, and even to make "movies" by ordering, stacking, and rapidly flipping through still
pictures. Beyond reinforcing the concepts, processes, and observational discipline involved in ordering,
such exercises are intended to be surprising or entertaining and, thereby, to make the issues at hand
more memorable.
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More generally, a certain degree of playfulness was built into the curriculum for pedagogical as well as
social or attitudinal reasons. That is, within Odyssey, the initial definition and development of the basic
processes is largely mediated through abstract exercises. This approach was adopted, as explained
earlier, in the interest of maintaining focus on the basic processes per se and of maximizing their
effectiveness across individual differences in conventional school skills and knowledge. However,
because abstract exercises are, by definition, relatively meaningless, they are far from ideal in the interest
of maximizing the processes' memorability--and the very structure of the course presumes their
memorability. Before leaving the introduction of any given process, we had to do what we could to
ensure that its representation would be sufficiently rich and fissile to be accessible when it was time to
recall it. The most obvious means of so doing might be to import a few relatively well developed
knowledge domains to the situation. Yet, in order for the course to be effective across differences in
students' background knowledge, it had also to be nonpresumptuous about the students' background
knowledge. Liberal recourse to traditional school knowledge was, we felt, too risky for these critical,
introductory lessons.
The use of "interesting" or "entertaining" materials was seen as an escape from this dilemma.
Specifically, to be interesting or entertaining, information or events must violate or otherwise surprisingly
interlace with one's prior intuitions and expectations. Thus, information can be potentially interesting
or entertaining to an individual only if that individual already possesses the body of conceptual
knowledge which it presumes. Information can succeed in interesting or entertaining an individual, only
to the extent that she or he brings that conceptual support to bear and, further, reflects upon and plays
it with new interrelations. In playfulness, therefore, lie the requisites of building a robust schema.
In the context of orderable dimensions, the issue of relative description is naturally raised again. With
it, through structured discovery, we take the opportunity to introduce the concept of implicit information
and its critical dependence on context and on the background knowledge and point of view of its
interpreter. Two problems from one of the exercises used to develop this point are shown in Figure 5.
To firm up these issues, the Unit ends with an exercise on Sneaky Advertisements, for example, "This
paint remover is fast and easy to use;" for each, the students are required to identify the missing but
invited comparison.
[Insert Figure 5 about here.]
Hierarchical classification is the process of dividing classes into subclasses and provides the essential
logic for part-whole analyses and, more generally, for coherent comparison of items across multiple
dimensions. After establishing the basics, the students are given exercises in generating classification
hierarchies from lists of topics and subtopics (as in the organization of a book), from lists of book titles
(as in the organization of libraries), in drawing inferences about similarities and differences from a tree-
graph of Indo-European languages, and in analyzing the dimensions of a problem space orthogonally
so as to solve brain teasers (as in experimental design). In the last lesson of the Unit, this logic is
developed as a strategy for playing the game of Twenty Questions, thus introducing the students to the
rudiments of Information Theory.
Analogical reasoning is the process of discovering comparable relationships between otherwise disparate
sets of information. It is often said that the analogy is our most powerful tool of creative thought. On
reflection, however, it becomes clear that it is not sound analogies that hold such productive potential,
but unsound ones--and even then, only given the analytic powers to determine exactly how the analogy
is unsound. Only given an explicit understanding of how one case is and is not analogous to a second,
can one efficiently capitalize on one's knowledge about the first while seeing clearly how it must be
modified or extended to fit the second. Analytic understanding of the logic of the analogy will be
required again and again throughout the course. The presentation and treatment of the analogy in
Odyssey is directed precisely toward developing this sort of analytical rigor.
Conventionally, the terms of an analogical exercise are presented in a list and separated by colons, for
example, kittens : cats :: foals : horses. Sometimes, for clarity, the colons are replaced with words, for
example, kittens are to cats just as foals are to horses. In either case, the left-to-right listing of the
terms obscures the underlying bidirectional structure of a sound analogy. That is, the analogy above is
sound not only because the two pairs [kittens and cats] and [foals and horses] differ commonly along
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the dimension of age, but also because the orthogonal pairs [kittens and foals] and [cats and horses]
differ commonly along the dimension of species. Note that the degrees of freedom are such that the
coherence of the analogy is spoiled if either (a) any other dimension of difference is introduced to any
one of the terms, for example, kittens : cats :: foals: mares, or (b) the extent of the nature of the
difference on any of the linking dimensions differs between pairs, for example, kittens : cats :: foals :
yearlings/nags.
To clarify the underlying logic of sound analogies, we introduced them through the format shown in
Figure 6. Examining Figure 6, one sees that the picture in the top, leftmost box differs from the one
to its right in both size and color; at the same time, it differs from the one beneath it only in shape. For
each problem, the students are required to identify all such dimensions of change and to write them on
the corresponding arrows, above and beside the analogy. The labeled arrows then provide all necessary
and sufficient information for identifying the missing term: It must differ from the box beside it exactly
and only in color and size; it must differ from the box above it exactly and only in shape; the missing
term must be the small black triangle. Although the purpose of these exercises is to develop the
student's appreciation of the logical structure of sound analogies, their success in so doing depends on
whether the student actually uses the dimensional information to solve the analogies rather than, say,
filling in the arrows and then independently selecting a response alternative. To encourage the former,
the Unit proceeds to three-by-three analogies. Readers familiar with Raven's (1938) Progressive Matrices
know how befuddling such problems can be; yet, their solution is completely straightforward if one
begins with an analysis of their dimensional structure (see Hunt, 1974, for a similar analysis).
[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
It is worth noting that the logically unbalanced or unsound analogy is also culturally important as
perhaps our most powerful mechanism of unfounded propaganda and prejudice (e.g., I don't trust Jack
because he looks like Dick). Equipping students with the knowledge and inclination to analyze analogies
should serve not only to increase their creative powers but, further, to protect them from such
stupidities.
Higher-order challenges. For purposes of illustrating the method through which higher-order challenges
are built upon the basic processes, I have chosen to draw principally on materials from the Unit on
"Word Relations" in the Understanding Language Series (Herrnstein, Adams, Huggins, & Starr, 1986).
Because these materials are more atomistic and less adventuresome than many in the curriculum, I do
so with some reluctance. It is unfortunately the case that the more complex and conceptually engaging
a set of materials, the more difficult it is to develop within the page and style restrictions of a paper such
as this, and I ask that the reader bear this in mind.
The first topic tackled in the Unit on "Word Relations" is synonyms or, more specifically, synonymous
descriptors from orderable dimensions. The students begin by calling out words that describe size.
After a number of such words have been generated, the students are challenged to order them from
smallest to largest. The ordered list ends up looking something like the following:
tiny
little, small
medium, middle-size
large, big
huge, giant
tremendous, enormous, gigantic,
where words are written on the same line wherever the students have disagreed with one another about
which exceeds which in meaning. The point is then drawn from the students that the closer any two
words are on the list, the closer their meaning. As reinforcement, the students are given a series of
problems as shown in Figure 7.
[Insert Figure 7 about here.]
Adams
Teaching Thinking - 21
The idea of relative proximity of meaning along a single, orderable dimension has considerable merit
for purposes of introducing the notion of synonyms. It is concrete, it inherently captures the relativistic
nature of synonymity, and it builds directly upon the basic analytic concepts and processes with which
the students have already been familiarized.
On the other hand, the meanings of relatively few words can be captured by their position onto a single,
orderable dimension. To the contrary, most words are like little bundles of meaning, conveying
characteristics or values on many dimensions at once. To help the students recognize this fact, they are
then challenged to generate an ordered list of animals.
Quickly the problem is discovered: Animals can be ordered along any number of dimensions: longevity,
ferocity, speed, adult weight, furriness, length of tail, and so on. To be synonyms, the meanings of two
words must be similar on every single one of their subtended dimensions. The point is reinforced
through a series of problems as illustrated in Figure 8. Taking the approach one step further,
grammatical function or part of speech is treated as one more dimension of a word's meaning.
[Insert Figure 8 about here.]
After synonyms, the Unit turns naturally to antonyms. If synonyms are words whose meanings are as
similar as possible, then what are antonyms? Without fail, some authoritative subset of the students will
announce that antonyms or opposites are words whose meanings are as different as possible, thus setting
up both the lesson and their receptivity to it. Are tall and sour antonyms? Could their meanings be any
more different? How about tall and red? Red and sour? In the process of suggesting and defending
the proper antonyms for each such pair of words, the students themselves raise the first critical
amendment to their initial definition: Two words can be antonyms only if their meanings fall on the
same dimensions. Their new discovery is then extended through a series of exercises designed to help
them consider the variety of dimensional contrasts that support antonymity (e.g., location, direction,
quantity, reciprocity, and negation).
To elicit the second critical amendment to their initial definition of an antonym, focus is returned to the
concept of orderable dimensions. With reference to the representation in Figure 9a, it is recalled that
synonymous words are those that lie very close together. Requesting an analogous heuristic for
antonyms yields the suggestion that they, in contrast, ought to lie as far apart as possible. Although the
heuristic works well for "freezing" (Figure 9b), it fails with "cool," and the students are thus led to
discover the principle of reflectivity that is illustrated in Figure 9c. For each problem in the exercise set
illustrated in Figure 10, the students are given an ordered list of words and asked to determine, on the
basis of this principle, the antonyms of each. Each of these problems includes at least one word that
was expected to be at least somewhat ill-defined in the minds of at least some of the students. At the
same time, however, each problem provides all necessary support for very precisely inferring the
meanings of such less familiar words. In this way, the exercise serves at once to reinforce and to
motivate the analytic processes at issue.
[Insert Figures 9 and 10 about here.]
The next two lessons in the Unit are on words and classification and can be summarized in terms of
three separate subgoals. The first, which involves more or less canonical word classification exercises,
is designed to sharpen the acumen and flexibility with which students can focus on one dimension of
meaning versus another. The second is designed to demonstrate how class- or category-level
information in a text can be used to narrow in on the meaning or significance of its unfamiliar words.
And the third, developed through a short story, is intended to provide a dramatic and understandable
overview of the way in which the English (Spanish) lexicon stands as a hierarchically classificatory system
of knowledge representation and reference.
The last lesson in the Unit is on verbal analogy and metaphor. The lesson is built directly and
rigorously upon the logic of the analogy as developed in the first lesson series, Foundations of Reasoning.
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Like other instructional packages on verbal analogy, it includes a number of standard form problems,
such as,
happy : ecstatic :: sad
(a) blissful
(b) angry
(c) miserable
(d) cry
Beyond solving the problems, however, students are required to check their solutions by rearranging the
pairs, for example, happy: sad:: ecstatic: (?), and articulating the dimensions or relationships that hold
the analogical pairs together.
The lesson then turns to metaphor, and the students are asked to fill in the blanks for series of problems
like the following:
The president is the head of the company.
president: company :: head: body
Education is the key to opportunity.
education: opportunity :: key : door
The purpose of the exercise is to clarify that the meaning of a metaphor derives from the analogy upon
which it implicitly rests. In addition, because students' answers inevitably differ from one another on
many of the problems, it creates a forum for defending and discussing their alternatives in terms of the
logic that supports them and the differences in the meaning they import to the sentence.
To extend the latter point, the students are given a series of problem pairs on metaphors and verbs.
For each problem pair, their challenge is to write down and contrast the implicit comparisons:
(a) The idea blossomed in her mind. like a flower
(b) The idea festered in her mind. like a sore
The goal, in brief, is to convey that metaphor, in its most productive capacity, is not simply about
colorful language; it is about powerful and precise language. Moreover, the communicative power of
the metaphor is owed directly to the logic of sound analogy. Recall that, to be sound, the subordinate
characteristics of an analogical pair must very nearly match. Yet, the salient characteristics of an idea
and a flower do not inherently match. The tension is resolved by imputing the characteristics of a flower
to the girl's idea.
Because the imputation of the characteristics of a predicate to its subject is a normal linguistic
phenomenon, its occurrence does not depend upon any prior recognition of the metaphorical nature of
the description. But even while the metaphor's affect is thus driven, its more precise and extended
implicative force pivots on the logic of the underlying analogy and can be greatly enhanced through its
explicit analysis. Thus, metaphor (a) above does not merely suggest that the idea matured and so do
flowers. It further asserts that the idea possessed the characteristics of a flower: beginning as an
unremarkable rub, it matured and unfolded, gradually and expansively taking on a delicate, natural
beauty. In metaphor (b), on the other hand, the idea began hurtfully, as an insult to the normal tissue
of thought; feeding on dirt and oozing malevolence, it sickened its host as it grew.
The extended importance of characteristics afforded through analogical allusion enables even greater
communicative power and efficiency when the discourse is extended beyond a single sentence. This
Adams
Teaching Thinking - 23
notion is developed later in the Series when attention is turned to the interpretation of fables and
allegories and the literary function of stereotypes (see Adams & Bruce, 1982).
In overview, the goal of the Unit on Word Relations is twofold. On one hand, the Unit's purpose is to
exploit the basic processes--dimensional analysis, simple and hierarchical classification, ordering, and
analogy--as a means of helping the students to systematize their understanding of word meaning, to
sharpen their receptive and generative use of words, and to gain an analytic edge on the challenge of
acquiring new words. On the other hand, the Unit's purpose is to exploit the domain of lexical
semantics as a means of reinforcing and extending the students' appreciation and understanding of the
basic processes.
This reciprocal goal structure is, in fact, common to all of the domain-specific Units in the curriculum
and a key aspect of its structure. That is, the central topic of the Units in each of the Lesson Series,
save Foundations of Reasoning, was in some sense arbitrary. The single definitive characteristic of the
problem domains addressed in these Series was that a mastery of the issues and challenges central to
any of them would be, in itself, a significant step towards intellectual independence. Ancillary to this
characteristic is that these issues and challenges are complex.
While the basic processes are intended to provide the starting point and leverage with respect to the
sound assimilation of these complex problem domains, that is only half of the sought effect. In addition
and following schema theory, it is intended that through their use in these other problem domains, the
basic processes will themselves become enmeshed, with appropriate elaboration, in an increasing variety
of problem types and situations. In this way, we seek to maximize the probability that they will be
recalled and applied to whatever amenable challenges the students may encounter beyond the
boundaries of this course.
Usability
The thrust of the course was to be conveyed through direct instruction, modeled on the Socratic Inquiry
Method (Collins & Stevens, 1982), and capitalizing on structured discovery. To maximize usability, the
Classroom Procedure for each lesson is presented in the form of a complete script. These scripts are
not intended to be used verbatim. Their purpose is instead to provide a detailed and highly imaginable
model of the sequence of interactive dialogue and activities through which the embedded lesson plan
might be achieved. Their purpose, in other words, is to minimize the need for inservice training. They
are offered as an efficient, easy-to-understand means for the teacher to build a usable schema of the
intended logic and progression of the course.
The Teachers' Manual also includes several other features designed to increase the comprehensibility
and usability of its lesson content. First, each lesson is prefaced with an explanation of its rationale, its
objectives, and its conceptual relationship to other lessons in the curriculum. Second, the text of the
Classroom Procedure for each lesson is divided into topical subsections and methodically formatted in
a way that visually contrasts or sets off not only teacher queries and student responses, but also
instructions to teachers, information to be written on the board, information about the exercises, and
key terms. The purpose of this formatting is to give teachers an easy means of recalling the lesson plan
while in class, without having to reread the script itself. By glancing at a page, teachers can easily pick
out the information they need to remember where in the lesson they are, what the key points are, and
where they are going next. It was our conviction that some such system of reminders-at-a-glance was
a critical component of a usable curriculum: In class, teachers' attention and thought should be freed,
to the extent possible, for the challenge of managing and stimulating their students.
Finally, the Odyssey curriculum includes within it all necessary texts, exercises, and demonstration
materials (with the very occasional exception of such things as paper clips and poster board). Exercises
and texts are provided in the Student Workbooks and reproduced, with correct answers, in the
appropriate spots in the Teachers' Manual. Demonstration materials are bound in the Teachers'
Manual.
None of this is intended to discourage teachers from extending the curriculum as they see fit. To the
contrary, we strongly encourage such extensions: The greater the number of ways that the various
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components of the course are exercised, the greater and more lasting its impact. By providing such
thorough conceptual and material support within the curriculum, we hope that we have created a base
upon which even the least confident teacher will feel invited to build--to draw other materials and
problem situations into the course, and to draw central components of the course into their instruction
on other subjects.
Evaluation
Within the time span of the Venezuelan project, we could not ask about long-term effects of the course.
We did, however, do our best to assess the immediate depth and breadth of the course's effects. In this
section, I summarize the design and results of the evaluation effort but, for a more detailed discussion,
you are referred to a recent article in the American Psychologist (Herrnstein, Nickerson, deSanchez, &
Swets, 1986).
During the 1982-1983 school year, approximately half of the 100 odd lessons in the course were taught
by teachers from the Venezuelan school system to about 450 seventh graders (12 classes) in barrio
schools in Barquisimeto, Venezuela. The 12 experimental classes were selected in conjunction with 12
control classes, matched on school and classroom parameters and, insofar as possible, on students' ages,
initial abilities, social-economic status, and so on.
To assess the impact of the course, all of the students completed a battery of tests at the beginning and
end of the school year. One set of these tests, the Target Abilities Tests (TATs), was designed by us
to assess students' mastery of the course material per se. The remainder of the battery, however, was
put together with an eye toward assessing the general rather than the specific carryover of the course.
That is, these tests were selected not to match specifics of the course but to provide a broad range of
aptitude and achievement measures.
Three sets of standardized tests were included in the battery: the Cattell Culture Fair Test (CATTELL;
Cattell & Cattell, 1961), which examines pictorially the abilities to extend series, classify, complete
matrices or analogies, and establish conditions; the Otis-Lennon School Ability Test (OLSAT; Otis &
Lennon, 1977), which presents a variety of word problems and is often used in the U.S. to estimate IQ;
and eight achievement or General Ability Tests2 (GATs). In addition, we collected qualitative
assessments of the course from teachers, students, and supervisors and administered some less formal
tests of reasoning and writing; these measures corroborated the results of the standardized tests.
As must be expected, the test scores of all students, both experimental and control, increased across the
school year. However, the gain of the experimental students was significantly greater than that of the
control students on each of the tests. One way of indicating the magnitude of the effects is to express
the gains realized by the experimental group as a percentage of the gains realized by the control group.
In these terms, the gain of the experimental group was 21% greater than the gain of the control group
on the CATTELL test, 46% greater on the OLSAT, 68% greater on the GATs, and 117% greater on
the TATs.
Further, in terms of the raw percentage of correct answers, the gains of the experimental students were
virtually constant across initial tests scores. This was very important to us since a major goal in
designing the course was to reach not just the quickest and not just the slowest, but all students. Finally,
analyses of the data revealed large differences in teacher effectiveness. This was to be expected since
our teachers were not selected on the basis of teaching prowess. But the point is that even those
students who took the course with the least effective teachers, significantly outgained their controls on
the standardized tests. We take this as very positive feedback in our efforts to make the curriculum
materials universally usable.
Conclusions
I have had three major goals in writing this paper. The first has been to argue that Chapter I students
could genuinely profit from instruction on thinking and that, for maximum impact, such instruction
should be introduced as a course in itself, separate from the regular curricula. I underscore "introduced"
Adams
Teaching Thinking - 25
because, of course, the ultimate goal is to transport such thinking skills to all other curricular and
extracurricular endeavors.
My second major goal has been to discuss some of the major issues and options one ought to consider
before adopting a course on thinking skills for use with any given group of students. This discussion was
centered on six existing programs on thinking skills. In the interest of making the discussion concrete,
I found something to criticize about each of these programs. I would like to clarify, however, that I
chose these six programs for discussion because each has been used relatively extensively, with
enthusiasm from students and teachers, and with its own brand of success.
Depending on a classroom's particular needs and constraints, any one of them might be a very good
candidate for implementation. For a relatively quick program that serves to build confidence or to "open
the door" to thinking, CoRT is a good choice. Given relatively homogeneous groups of students and a
special interest in enhancing language arts and mathematics understanding, Think and Intuitive Math are
good choices. For broad or large-scale implementation, I am less enthusiastic about Instrumental
Enrichment because I think, relative to its typical returns, it requires an awful lot of teacher training and
classroom time; on the other hand, for students who are markedly below norm, this program seems a
uniquely appropriate and effective option. Finally, for Chapter I students whose performance is close
to grade-level or above, both Philosophy for Children and Productive Thinking are worth considering.
The first of these offers the side benefit of improving reading comprehension scores; the second seems
especially effective in increasing intellectual independence.
Beyond these six programs, there are and will be many others from which to choose. My third major
goal has been to persuade the reader of my belief that the field is expanding not just in number of
programs but in sophistication as well. The Odyssey program, which is just now being published, was
described as an example of the forthcoming efforts. Although it has not been formally evaluated in the
United States, the results of the Venezuelan experiment are very positive. As for the others, please
note: Just because I could not obtain adequate information about them for present purposes does not
mean there is none or will not be more.
As these programs proliferate, I hope that the present paper will help to define some of the factors
governing their appropriateness and potential effectiveness for any given group of students. I hope,
moreover, that it will supply some of the motivation and justification for giving the programs serious
consideration. For Chapter I students especially, the direct teaching of thinking promises to be the best
institutionalizable means of developing the competencies and attitudes they need to make the most of
their schooling and their lives.
Adams
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Footnotes
'innovative Sciences, Inc., provided me with evaluation reports from the following public schools:
Detroit Public Schools/Region Eight, Detroit, Michigan; Memphis City Schools, Memphis, Tennessee;
Morris Central School, Morris, New York: Natchitoches Central High School, Natchitoches, Louisiana;
Franklin Pierce School District, Tacoma, Washington; and Taos Junior High School, Taos, New Mexico.
2The GAT was comprised of three subtests from Guidance Testing Associates; Tests of General
Ability (Manuel, 1962a); three subtests from Guidance Testing Associates' Tests of Reading (Manuel,
1962b); one from the Puerto Rican Department of Education; and one developed by our own staff to
assess arithmetic skills.
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I thank Patricia Sallee for her help in preparing the manuscript. Correspondence concerning this article
should be addressed to M. J. Adams, BBN Laboratories Incorporated, 10 Moulton St., Cambridge, MA
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Table 1
Contents of Odyssey
Series and Unit Titles and Descriptions Number of Lessons
LESSON SERIES I: FOUNDATIONS OF REASONING
Unit 1: Observation and Classification 6
Using dimensions and characteristics to analyze and
organize similarities and differences; discovering
the basics of classification and hypothesis-testing.
Unit 2: Ordering 5
Recognizing and extrapolating different types of
sequences; discovering special properties of
orderable dimensions.
Unit 3: Hierarchical Classification 3
Exploring the structure and utility of classification
hierarchies.
Unit 4: Analogies: Discovering Relationships 4
Analyzing the dimensional structure of simple and
complex analogies.
Unit 5: Spatial Reasoning and Strategies 3
Developing strategies to solve problems of resource
allocation via tangrams.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Series and Unit Titles and Descriptions Number of Lessons
LESSON SERIES II: UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE
Unit 1: Word Relations 6
Appreciating the multidimensional nature of word
meanings.
Unit 2: The Structure of Language 5
Discovering the logic and utility of rhetorical
conventions.
Unit 3: Information and Interpretation 5
Analyzing text for explicit information, implicit
information, and point of view
LESSON SERIES III: VERBAL REASONING
Unit 1: Assertions 10
Exploring the structure and interpretation of simple
propositions.
Unit 2: Arguments 10
Analyzing logical arguments; evaluating and constructing
complex arguments.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Series and Unit Titles and Descriptions Number of Lessons
LESSON SERIES IV: PROBLEM SOLVING
Unit 1: Linear Representations 5
Constructing linear representations to interpret
n-term series problems.
Unit 2: Tabular Representations 4
Constructing tabular representations to solve
multivariate word problems.
Unit 3: Representations by Simulation and Enactment 4
Representing and interpreting dynamic problem spaces
through simulation and enactment.
Unit 4: Systematic Trial and Error 2
Developing systematic methods for enumerating all
possible solutions; developing efficient methods
for selecting among such solutions.
Unit 5: Thinking Out the Implications
Examining the constraints of givens and solutions for
problem-solving clues.
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Table 1 (Continued)
Series and Unit Titles and Descriptions Number of Lessons
LESSON SERIES V: DECISION MAKING
Unit 1: Introduction to Decision Making 3
Identifying and representing alternatives; trading off
outcome desirability and likelihood in selecting between
alternatives.
Unit 2: Gathering and Evaluating Information to Reduce Uncertainty 5
Appreciating the importance of being thorough in
gathering information, evaluating consistency,
credibility, and relevance of data.
Unit 3: Analyzing Complex Decision Situations 2
Evaluating complex alternatives in terms of the
dimensions on which they differ and the relative
desirability of their characteristics on each of
those dimensions.
LESSON SERIES VI: INVENTIVE THINKING
Unit 1: Design 9
Analyzing the designs of common objects in terms
of functional dimensions; inventing designs from
functional criteria.
Unit 2: Procedures as Designs 6
Analyzing and inventing procedures in terms of the
functional significance of their steps.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. At the end of the first lesson, the students are given a series of such illustrations and asked
to figure out what is wrong with each. The objectives are, first, to encourage them to exercise the
process of examining a scene characteristic by characteristic and, second, to let them demonstrate to
themselves that their observational powers are not as sharp as they might be. (From Adams, Buscaglia,
deSanchez, & Swets, 1976.)
Figure 2. A basic exercise illustrating the point that any collection of objects can be classified according
to their similarities and differences along as many dimensions as they can be described. To facilitate
the task, the students are provided with a full page duplicate of the inset at the top which they are to
cut apart on the dotted lines. (From Adams, Buscaglia, deSanchez, & Swets, 1976.)
Figure 3. This problem appears midway through an exercise on hypothesis-testing. Its purpose is to
reinforce the importance of positive information. The essential characteristic of tweegles is that they
have feathers. (From Adams, Buscaglia, deSanchez, & Swets, 1976.)
Figure 4. Examples of the abstract exercises through which sequences are introduced. For each
problem, the students are to select the next member of the sequence from the lettered alternatives and
to write down whether the sequence is progressive, cyclical, or alternating. (From Adams, Buscaglia,
deSanchez, & Swets, 1976.)
Figure 5. A series of problems such as that given at top illustrate that the meaning of a descriptor from
orderable dimensions is always relative, presuming a standard of comparison whether or not it is stated.
The last problem of the set, given at bottom, illustrates that if you are not quite sure whether the
comparison you have in mind will be obvious to your audience, you'd better make it explicit. (From
Adams, Buscaglia, deSanchez, & Swets, 1976.)
Figure 6. An example of the problems through which the structure of sound analogies is introduced.
After the students have written the horizontal and vertical dimensions of change on the corresponding
arrows, they can deductively determine the correct response alternative: it must differ from the one
beside it only in color and size and from the one above it only in shape. (From Adams, Buscaglia,
deSanchez, & Swets, 1976.)
Figure 7. Examples of the problems through which the concept of synonymity is developed for words
whose meanings lie on a single orderable dimension. The italicized words represent student responses.
(From Herrnstein, Adams, Huggins, & Starr, 1976.)
Figure 8. The meanings of most words include characteristics from many dimensions at once. The
example above is from an exercise illustrating that two such words can be synonyms only if they entail
very similar characteristics on every one of their underlying dimensions of meaning. (From Herrnstein,
Adams, Huggins, & Starr, 1976.)
Figure 9. In earlier lessons, analog representations such as that shown in (a) were used to support the
point that the closer two words lie on an orderable dimension, the better they are as synonyms of one
another. Recall of that rule leads readily to the suggestion that anonyms ought to lie as far apart from
each other as possible, as shown in (b). The principle of reflectivity, shown in (c), is established through
discussion. (From Herrnstein, Adams, Huggins, & Starr, 1976.)
Figure 10. The words on the left are listed in order from most positive to most negative. By applying
the rule at the top, the students are to divide the list up into autonymous pairs (words in parentheses
represent student responses). Note that, as long as the student is familiar with some of the words on
a list, the structure of the exercise allows for the meanings of the remainder to be inferred quite
precisely. (From Herrnstein, Adams, Huggins, & Starr, 1976.)
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What is wrong?
Figure 1
Classification
1. Dimension
Class 1:
= Color
Class 2:
2. Dimension = Shape
Class 1: Class 2:
Class 3:
3. Dimension = Size
Class 1: Class 2:
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"Monkeys are exceptionally intelligent."
The author probably means:
a) Monkeys are exceptionally intelligent compared to Albert Einstein.
b) Monkeys are exceptionally intelligent compared to other animals.
c) Monkeys are exceptionally intelligent compared to rocks.
"A bripala is very expensive."
The author probably means:
a) A bripala is expensive compared to a blouse.
b) A bripala is expensive compared to a diamond.
c) A bripala is expensive compared to a sandwich.
Figure 5
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Synonyms from Orderable Dimensions
Inst•uctions: Each line on the r.ht repreents an orderable domenorn.k
Order the wnrds in the list by wrning each one beside one of the do.s
on the line. Then find the best synonym for the underlined word in
the sentence and w• ate it n the space provided.
Set 1:
1. hot
icy
boLling
cool
scalding
cold
wairm
frozen
icy/ frnen
I cold
YU)
?_ - J»
wa77"
boiling sca.ldig
They burned their mouths on the boting tea.
Snon.ym for b scalding
2. often
always
rarely
frequently
occasionally
never
never
rarely
i occasionally
frequently often
always
The nurse sated that children should bathe Pi.n.
s:on•m foro frequently
Figure 7
Not Quite Synonyms
Instructions: Match each pair of words to the description of the
difference in their meaning. Write the letter that identifies the
description in the blank beside the word pair.
1. - jail - cage
petite - puny
a) Both are rocks, but the first is
very big while the second is very
smalL
pig- pork
boulder - pebble
b) The first is for locking up people,
while the second is for locking
up animals.
c) Both mean small, but the first is
kind while the second is insulting.
d) It's the same animal, but you
use the first word when it's running
around and the second when
you're going to eat it.
Figure 8
frppezint
c4 yicv
cold
cool
just right
warm
hot
scalding
boiling
(b)
freezing
icy
cold
cool
just right
warm
hot
scalding
boiling
4
(c)
freezing
icy
cold
cool
just right
warm
Sscalding
boiling
Figure 9
I
(a)
---
I-.
^
»
!4
I
hot
-4
-I %.R
1. adore
love
like
dislike
hate
abhor
(abhor)
(dislike)
11. exalt
laud
praise
approve
disapprove
rebuke
censure
condemn
exalt - (conc
(laud)
praise -
demn)
- censure
frebuke)
(aoorove) - disapprove
Figure 10
Antonym Rule
Two words from an orderable dimension are antonyms if they lie
1. on opposite sides of the middle of the dimension, and
2. the same distance from the middle of the dimension.
adore -
(love) - hate
like -


